A book on the practical purpose and limits of moral philosophy in Kant

in preparation

A paper on the emotional aspect of enlightenment

in preparation

A paper on dehumanization and metaphor

in preparation

A paper on the efficacy of law

in preparation

A paper on Kant's casuistical questions

in preparation

‘Kant's Derivation of Imperatives of Duty’

forthcoming in Kantian Review (open access)

On the currently dominant reading of the 'Groundwork,' Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision-procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the 'Groundwork' by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision-procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.

‘Kant's Racism as a Philosophical Problem’

2023, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (open access)

Immanuel Kant was possibly both the most influential racist as well as the most influential moral philosopher of modern, western thought. So far, authors have either interpreted Kant as an ‘inconsistent egalitarian’ or as a ‘consistent inegalitarian.’ On the former view, Kant failed to draw the necessary conclusions from his own moral philosophy; on the latter view, Kant did not consider non-white people as persons at all. However, both standard interpretations face significant textual difficulties; instead, I argue that Kant’s moral egalitarianism is so thin as to remain almost entirely useless as an antidote to racism. Consequently, we should neither regard Kant’s racism as a mere personal failure nor as a quaint 18th century belief in ‘sub-humans.’ Instead, I argue that Kant’s racism highlights a perennial philosophical difficulty: how do we get from abstract principles to substantive ideals in a way that doesn’t merely polish up our existing prejudices?

‘Is the rule of recognition really a duty-imposing rule?’

2023, Journal of Legal Philosophy (open access)

According to a persistent assumption in legal philosophy, the social rule at the foundation of a legal system (the Rule of Recognition) serves both an epistemic and a duty-imposing function. Thus, some authors have claimed that it would be a formidable problem for legal philosophy to explain how such social rules can impose duties, and some have taken it upon themselves to show how social practices might just do that. However, I argue that this orthodox assumption about the dual function of rule of recognition is ill-founded. Contrary to the orthodox view, we have no good reasons to ascribe more than an epistemic function to the rule of recognition. Accordingly, the norms deriving immediately from the rule of recognition are no different than those entailed by other epistemic, grammatical or syntactic norms. Consequently, accounts of the normativity of law need not explain how social practices like conventions or plans might impose duties on the officials of a legal system.

'Between Thinking and Acting: Fichte's Deduction of the Concept of Right'

2023, Manuscrito (open access)

Fichte’s ambitious project in the Foundations of Natural Right is to provide an a priori deduction of the concept of right independently from morality. So far, interpretations of Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right have persistently fallen into one of two rough categories: either they (re)interpret the normative necessity of right in terms of moral or quasi-moral normativity or they interpret right’s normative necessity in terms of hypothetical imperatives. However, each of these interpretations faces significant exegetical difficulties. By contrast, I argue that we can understand the normative necessity of right in terms of conceptual necessity. On this view, right does not tell us what ought to be done, but instead tells us what we are doing and have done. Not only does this provide for a promising philosophical account of the non-moral normativity of right, but also provides a compelling reading of Fichte’s text in both the deduction of the concept of right in the Foundations of Natural Right as well as his discussion of the application of the concept of right and coercion.

‘The Nature of Law’

University of Chicago, Spring Quarter

Kantian ethics and Kant’s racism (graduate level)

Advanced topics in philosophy of law (graduate level)

Kant’s philosophy of right (graduate level)

Introduction to philosophy

Introduction to ethics

Introduction to environmental ethics

Introduction to Kant's ethics

Introduction to philosophy of law

Introduction to social and political philosophy

Introduction to Marx

PhD (Philosophy)

University of Chicago

LLM

University of Cambridge

LLB

King's College London

Kant

Ethics

Philosophy of Law

Social and political philosophy

Post-Kantian German philosophy

Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles

‘Kant's Derivation of Imperatives of Duty’

Kantian Review (open access)

‘Kant's Racism as a Philosophical Problem’

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (open access)

‘Is the rule of recognition really a duty-imposing rule?’

Journal of Legal Philosophy (open access)

‘Between Thinking and Acting: Fichte’s Deduction of the Concept of Right’

Manuscrito (open access)

Graduate Council Research Award

University of Chicago

Graduate Council Research Award

University of Chicago

St Edmunds College Prize

University of Cambridge

Dickson Poon School of Law Prize in Tort Law

King’s College London

Affiliated Doctoral Fellow

Franke Institute for the Humanities, University of Chicago

UC Mellon Dissertation Completion Fellow

Division of the Humanities, University of Chicago

Ernst Freund Fellow in Law and Philosophy

University of Chicago Law School

Visiting Doctoral Fellow

Forschungskolleg Analytic German Idealism, Universität Leipzig

Visiting Doctoral Fellow

Forschungskolleg Analytic German Idealism, Universität Leipzig

King’s Undergraduate Research Fellow

Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London

‘Dehumanization as Conceptual Metaphor’

Franke Affiliated Fellows’ Meeting, University of Chicago

‘The Emotional Labor of Enlightenment’

German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘The Efficacy Puzzle’

Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Dehumanization and the Metaphorical Structuring of Social Experience’

X. Conference for Practical Philosophy, Universität Salzburg

‘Kant’s Derivation of Imperatives of Duty’

Leuven Kant Conference, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

‘The Post-Colonial Critique of Kant’

German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Kant’s Racism as a Philosophical Problem’

IX. Conference for Practical Philosophy, Universität Salzburg

‘Kant’s Racism as a Philosophical Problem’

Munich Graduate Conference in Ethics, Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München

‘Kant on Reflection in Moral Knowledge’

Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Kant’s Racism as a Philosophical Problem’

UCSD Modern Philosophy Graduate Workshop, University of California, San Diego

‘Kant on the Purpose of Moral Philosophy’

German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Is the Rule of Recognition really a duty-imposing rule?’

Symposium at the APA Central Division Meeting (online)

‘Hegel’s Empty-Formalism Charge’

German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Fichte’s Deduction of the Concept of Right’

German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago

‘Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis’

Symposium at the APA Central Division Meeting (presented by Jenna Zhang as substitute speaker), Chicago

‘Reframing the inner morality of law’

Conference of the Australasian Society of Legal Philosophy, University of Sydney

Undergraduate Level Courses

‘The Nature of Law’

University of Chicago, Spring quarter

As Teaching Assistant

‘Philosophy of Economics’

University of Chicago, Winter quarter

‘Introduction to Marx’

University of Chicago, Autumn quarter

‘History of Philosophy III: Kant and the 19th Century’

University of Chicago, Spring quarter (online)